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DEAF JUSTICE?: BATTERED WOMEN 
UNJUSTLY IMPRISONED PRIOR TO THE 
ENACTMENT OF EVIDENCE CODE 
SECTION 1107 
Scott Gregory Baker* 
Geneva Love's husband was in the military; they 
lived in a military town. Her husband beat her. 
Geneva Love was pregnant with their second 
child. When she tried to leave the abusive rela-
tionship her husband confronted her with more 
violence; she was forced to kill him. The impor-
tance of evidence concerning Battered Women's 
Syndrome was not understood by Geneva Love's 
trial attorney. Geneva Love, an African-American 
woman, was convicted by an all-white jury of her 
husband's peers. Geneva Love was denied justice. 
Geneva Love petitioned for clemency. Clemency 
was denied. Geneva Love was denied compassion, 
and again justice was denied. Geneva Love re-
mains in prison; where is her justice? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 5, 1993, Assembly Bill 22951 (hereinafter AB 
2295) was introduced by Assembly Member Barbara Friedman.s 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995. I thank my wife, Susanne 
Baker, for her patience, love, and support. I thank my editors Donna Kotake and Re-
becca Weisman, for their help and support during this project; and Christina Cordoza 
and Bridget Ford, for providing me with research materials and insights I would not 
have found elsewhere. I thank Professor Roberta Simon for her comments and sugges-
tions regarding organization and style. Special thanks to Professor Susan Rutberg for 
challenging me during this project and for providing me with critical substantive law 
editing. 
1. Assembly Bill 2295, Cal. Leg., 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (proposed Mar. 5, 1993)[herein-
after AB 2295). 
2. The Honorable Barbara Friedman is the Assembly Member for the Fortieth As-
sembly District, California Legislature. 
99 
1
Baker: Battered Women Unjustly Imprisoned
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
100 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:99 
On October 11, 1993, the Governor of the State of California3 
vetoed AB 2295.· Assembly Bill 2295 was designed to provide a 
fair and even application of the law to those individuals affected 
by the issue of battered woman syndrome (hereinafter BWS):I 
Battered women charged with criminal activity after January 1, 
1992 are permitted to present battered woman syndrome expert 
testimony at their trials pursuant to Evidence Code Section 
1107.8 Battered women convicted prior to this date remain un-
justly imprisoned because they have been denied the opportu-
nity to present this crucial evidence, and there is seemingly no 
viable avenue of relief. AB 2295 was developed to provide a rem-
edy to these individuals. 
Assembly Bill 2295 proposed to give individuals whose con-
victions for killing their abusive partners became final before 
January 1, 1992 a chance for review of their original trial 
through a writ of error coram nobis' or writ of error coram 
vobis8 • Assembly Bill 2295 would have only affected individuals 
whose cases at trial would have been bolstered by the admission 
of battered woman syndrome evidence pursuant to Evidence 
Code Section 1107. 
3. Presently, The Honorable Pete Wilson. 
4. Veto Message regarding AB 2295 from The Honorable Pete Wilson, Governor of 
California, to The Members of the California Assembly, dated October 11, 1993 [herein-
after Veto]. As of the date this article went to press, AB 2295 was in the process of being 
re-introduced in the California Assembly for the 1994-95 Regular Session. The form and 
content of the re-introduced bill are as yet unknown. 
5. The term Battered Woman Syndrome [hereinafter BWS] is used to describe an 
individual's reactions, experiences, and feelings under conditions of repeated violence 
and abuse. BWS is not a separate defense. It is an expert's description of a psychological 
condition that results from intense trauma. It is useful in explaining to a jury why a 
particular battered woman's response to a violent situation was reasonable, and how her 
perception of imminence differs from that of a non-battered person. 
6. Evidence Code Section 1107, enacted January 1, 1992, established the admissibil-
ity of BWS expert testimony in criminal cases. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 
1993). 
7. A writ of error coram nobis is addressed to the court where the petitioner was 
convicted. If the judgment was affirmed by an appellate court the writ of error coram 
nobis must be brought in the appellate court which affirmed the judgment. CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1265 (West Supp. 1993). If there was no appeal, the writ of error coram nobis is 
addressed to the trial court. 
8. A writ of error coram vobis petition is addressed to a court other than the trial 
court, usually an appellate court. The appellate court then directs a writ of error to the 
original trial court. Therefore a writ of error coram vobis is only an avenue for relief if no 
appeal was taken from the judgment. See Cal. Assembly Committee on Public Safety, 
Committee Analysis, May 18, 1993 hearing date; People v. Welch, 394 P.2d 926, 929 (Cal. 
1964). 
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This article will explain why Assembly Bill 2295 was and 
still is necessary to provide relief for battered women convicted 
prior to the enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107, and in-
cludes discussions of: BWS theory; use of BWS testimony in 
California Courts; Evidence Code Section 1107; and an analysis 
of Assembly Bill 2295. 
The article will discuss the problem presented by Evidence 
Code Section 1107, and critique the only purported "avenue of 
relief' available for a battered woman convicted of killing her 
abusive partner prior to January 1, 1992, namely executive clem-
ency.9 The article will include a discussion of Geneva Love's 
case, which provides a compelling example of the need for an 
alternative to clemency, such as AB 2295. The article will out-
line Governor Wilson's concerns regarding AB 2295. The article 
will then respond to Governor Wilson's stated bases for rejecting 
the Bill. This will include an argument in support of a version of 
AB 2295 modified to address Governor Wilson's concerns with 
AB 2295, which will provide a procedure for battered women 
convicted of killing their abusive partners prior to the enact-
ment of Evidence Code Section 1107 to benefit by the provisions 
of Evidence Code Section 1107. 
II. WHY LEGISLATION LIKE ASSEMBLY BILL 2295 IS 
NECESSARY 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
Battered woman syndrome is a description of how a bat-
tered woman feels and reacts under conditions of repeated vio-
lence and abuse. BWS testimony is of critical importance be-
cause it educates the jury as to how a battered person will likely 
react in a particular situation.10 
Dr. Lenore Walker defines BWS as a pattern of psychologi-
cal and behavioral symptoms found in women living in relation-
9. The Governor may grant clemency, including reprieves, pardons, or commuta-
tions after sentence, except in cases involving impeachment. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8. 
lD. See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Battered Women's Response to Vio-
lence, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 1993), reprinted in DEFENDING BATTERED 
WOMEN IN CRIMINAL CASES (ABA)(1993). 
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ships tainted by abuse.ll Dr. Walker's research found the occur- ' 
rence of a three phase "cycle of violence"12 in many of the cases 
of the battered women she interviewed in her early research. 
The first phase is a tension-building phase which includes 
verbal abuse and minor battering incidents. The woman reacts 
by attempting to placate the batterer to prevent an escalation of 
violence. These placatory efforts also legitimize the batterer's 
belief that he has the right to abuse the woman. As the cycle 
progresses, these placatory attempts become less effective and 
the tension grows. Many battered women say the worst aspect of 
the tension-building phase is the psychological anguish, and 
some even provoke an acute incident "to get it over with."lS 
The second phase occurs when the violence and verbal 
abuse erupt into an acute battering incident, involving brutal vi-
olence, injury, and sometimes death. The battered woman can-
not predict when the acute battering incident will occur, but 
knows it is inevitable.14 Living in constant fear of injury and 
subject to attack at any moment results in a heightened percep-
tion of danger in a battered woman.1II 
The final phase of the cycle involves a tranquil period of 
loving contrition in which the batterer exhibits apologetic and 
loving behavior. The absence of tension and violence creates an 
overwhelming feeling of relief. The battered woman believes 
that her batterer is sincere when he promises that the violence 
will "never happen again. "16 
Constant subjection to chronic abuse permanently affects 
the psyche of the victim. The battered woman's reactions are 
11. See DR. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE 4-5 (1989). Dr. Lenore E. Walker 
is a clinical and forensic psychologist, and a nationally recognized authority on battered 
women. Dr. Walker developed her theory of BWS through research, funded by the Na-
tional Institutes of Mental Health [hereinafter NIMH1, conducted at the Battered Wo-
man Research Center [hereinafter BWRCl in Denver, Colorado from 1978-81. This re-
search involved interviews with 400 battered women, concerning 1600 battering 
incidents. Dr. Walker's books concerning BWS include: THE BATI'ERED WOMAN (1979); 
THE BATl'ERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); and TERRIFYING LOVE (1989). 
12. WALKER, supra note 11, at 42. 
13. See id. at 42-43. 
14. WALKER, supra note 11, at 42-43. 
15. [d. at 26. 
16. [d. at 43-45. 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss1/4
1994] BATTERED WOMEN UNJUSTLY IMPRISONED 103 
thus substantially different than a non-battered person's reac-
tions. The failure to understand this leads to one of the most 
common, albeit natural, misconceptions concerning the battered 
woman, namely, "why does she stay, why not just leave?" Three 
theories concerning human behavior help explain why battered 
women do not leave the battering relationship:17 the social-learn-
ing theory of intermittent. reinforcement,18 Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder,ls and "learned helplessness."2o 
17. WALKER, supra note 11, at 47. 
18. In the social-learning theory of "intermittent reinforcement," behavioral psy-
chologists have found that behavior which has been intermittently reinforced is the be-
havior which is the most difficult to stop. For a battered woman, the batterer's random 
behavior and unpredictable violence are his main source of power. This random, unpre-
dictable violence, combined with intermittent periods of loving contrition confuse the 
battered woman psychologically. From one moment to the next, she does not know 
whether she will be faced with her "good" husband or her "bad" husband. The result is 
that the battered woman is left psychologically scarred; she can only cling to the hope 
that her good husband will return and the violence will end. WALKER, supra note 11, at 
47. 
19. The experiencing of a significant trauma may result in a psychological diagnosis 
known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder [hereinafter PTSD]. Although PTSD-like 
symptoms have been diagnosed for over a hundred years, PTSD did not gain prominence 
until after the Vietnam War. PTSD symptoms include: (1) a re-experiencing of the 
trauma, where the sufferer is unable to stop thinking about the traumatic event; (2) 
distancing behavior, including invoking the defense mechanisms of denial, repression, 
suppression, and disassociation; and (3) effects on the nervous system, including diffi-
culty sleeping, irritability or outbursts of anger, difficulty concentrating, hypervigilence, 
exaggerated startle response, and physiological reactivity. Other traumatic events or feel-
ings of overwhelming helplessness may cause a recalling of the prior trauma, evoking the 
feelings and symptoms of the original trauma. The suffering of the traumatic event 
whi«h triggers PTSD results in a changed view of the world. The sufferer is more "on 
guard" or hypervigilent. PTSD is legally significant because it is a biological and psycho-
logical condition which may obliterate free will. Indeed, PTSD is more complex and se-
vere when the trauma is prolonged or severe, as in the case of battered women. See 
Nancy Kaser-Boyd, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders in Children and Adults: The Le-
gal Relevance, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. at 1601, 1611-16 (forthcoming 1993)[hereinafter 
Kaser-Boyd]; see Steven R. Balash and Nancy Kaser-Boyd, Battered Women in Crimi-
nal Cases, DEFENDING BATTERED WOMEN IN CRIMINAL CASES (ABA)(1993), at 2-4 [herein-
after Balash & Kaser-Boyd]. BWS is a subcategory of PTSD, and will be classified as 
such by the American Psychiatric Association in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders [hereinafter DSM], version DSM-IV. See Susan Rutberg, Not Guilty 
By Reason of Victimization, FORUM (Dec. 1993). 
20. "Learned helplessness" is a theory which was developed by Dr. Martin Selig-
man, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania. To understand learned helpless-
ness, one must focus on an individual's beliefs regarding the situation they are in. As in 
the case of PTSD, if a person believes they do not have control over a situation, he will 
be more likely to respond with coping responses rather than by trying to escape. As 
applied to a battered woman, she does not attempt to leave because she cannot predict 
her own safety; she believes that nothing can be done, by her or by anyone else, which 
will change her situation. A battered woman is unable to predict the consequences of her 
actions, because there is no relationship between her conduct and the frequency of abuse 
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A batterer uses intermittent reinforcement by sometimes in-
dulging the battered woman and other times displaying physical 
and psychological cruelty.21 This random and unpredictable be-
havior by the batterer affects the battered woman psychologi-
cally, leaving her hoping that the next time will be different.22 
Experiencing severe trauma can trigger Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder which may result in certain psychological symp-
toms including: persistent sense of threat, denial, emotional 
"numbing," dissociation, or "self-medicating" with drugs and al-
cohol,2s The persistent sense of threat can stifle a battered wo-
man's ability to make decisions.24 Denial causes the battered wo-
man to sense she is in a dangerous relationship but renders her 
incapable of admitting that her spouse will kill her.211 
"Learned helplessness" occurs when the battered woman 
cannot predict her own safety because regardless of her conduct 
she is faced with the batterer's random and unpredictable abu-
sive behavior.2s Although a battered woman does not necessarily 
learn to be helpless, she often discovers that she is unable to 
predict the effect her behavior will have.27 "Learned helpless-
ness" causes a person to choose "behavioral responses which will 
have the highest predictability of an effect within the known, or 
familiar, situation; they avoid responses - like escape, for in-
stance - that launch them into the unknown."28 
Dr. Walker's research was limited to situations involving se-
vere violence over extended periods of time, and concerned bat-
inflicted on her. It is this "learned helplessness" which prevents a battered woman from 
leaving the battering relationship, even though it may appear to outsiders that the bat-
tered woman could do so safely. Dr. Walker's research has revealed that when a battered 
woman attempts to leave, or does leave, the abuse often escalates at the point of separa-
tion, and the battered woman faces a greater risk of death. Greater risk is involved when 
the battered woman decides to leave. The batterer becomes enraged because his control 
is being challenged, and to him the death of the battered woman is a punishment for her 
attempting to leave him. WALKER, supra note 11, at 48-51. 
21. [d. at 47. 
22. [d. 
23. Balash & Kaser-Boyd, supra note 19, at 6. 
24. [d. at 14. 
25. [d .. 
26. WALKER, supra note 11, at 50. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. at 50-51. 
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tered women who did not fight back.29 One problem which arises 
is that prosecutors have been using BWS theory to impeach a 
battered woman witness' testimony because she may not fit 
neatly into Dr. Walker's categorical definition of BWS.30 Subse-
quent research has demonstrated that BWS characteristics also 
may be found in situations where less severity is involved and 
when the person does fight back.31 In fact, BWS is neither an 
actual clinical diagnosis of a disorder nor a mental illness, but 
rather a description of how a norm.al person responds to chronic. 
abuse or traumatic stress.32 
B. USE OF BWS TESTIMONY IN CALIFORNIA COURTS 
Prior to the enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107, the 
courts of California had not treated the admissibility of BWS 
testimony consistently. In fact, the application of BWS evidence 
to a self-defense claim was not decided in a California appellate 
court case until 1989 in People v. Aris.33 In the case of a bat-
tered woman who claims self-defense in killing her abuser, self-
defense is analyzed as having two requirements: 
(1) the defendant's acts causing the victim's death 
were motivated by an actual (also referred to as 
"genuine" or "honest") belief or perception that 
(a) the defendant was in imminent danger of 
death or great bodily injury from an unlawful at-
tack or threat by the victim and (b) the defend-
ant's acts were necessary to prevent the injury; 
and (2) a reasonable person in the same circum-
stances would have had the same perception and 
done the same acts.84 
29. Cal. Senate Committee on Judiciary, Committee Analysis regarding AB 2273, 
June 16, 1992 hearing date [hereinafter AB 2273). 
30. See id. 
31. [d.; see Dutton, supra note 10; see Balash & Kaser-Boyd, supra note 19, at 6. 
32. See AB 2273, supra note 29; see Balash & Kaser-Boyd, supra note 19, at 2, 10; 
see Dutton, supra note 10, at 11. 
33. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Ct. App. 1989). The court held that the exclu-
sion of expert testimony regarding BWS was error, but harmless error in the context of 
the case because the defendant had shot her batterer while he slept. Therefore, there was 
nothing in his behavior indicating the existence of an imminent danger as that term is 
defined by California law, and it is not reasonably probable that BWS testimony would 
convince the jury that, nevertheless, the defendant honestly perceived an imminent dan-
ger resulting in a different verdict. 
34. [d. at 172. 
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Under the California Penal Code, the classification for a 
homicide committed in self-defense is a justifiable homicide, as 
opposed to an excusable homicide. 811 Excuses for homicide in-
clude accident, misfortune, sufficient provocation, insanity and 
provocation, and a genuine, but unreasonable, belief in the need 
for self-defense.86 Justification declares the allegedly criminal 
act legal, while excuse admits the act's criminality but declares 
the allegedly criminal actor not to blame.87 
Two types of self-defense exist in California: perfect self-
defense and imperfect self-defense.88 Perfect self-defense89 re-
quires both subjective honesty and objective reasonableness, and 
completely exonerates the accused.40 Subjective honesty evalu-
ates the defendant's state of mind.u Objective reasonableness 
questions whether a reasonable person would have believed and 
acted as the defendant did.42 Imperfect self-defense requires 
only subjective honesty and negates malice aforethought, reduc-
ing the homicide to voluntary manslaughter.48 Both perfect and 
imperfect self-defense require an honest belief that the killer is 
in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury from the 
victim.44 
BWS expert testimony is useful in the defense of battered 
women accused of killing their abusive spouses because it can 
explain why a particular battered woman subjectively believed 
that her self-defense was necessary. Because BWS can illustrate 
why a particular battered woman had an honest belief of immi-
nent danger,411 it should be used in the objective reasonableness 
test to show why a battered woman believed and acted as she 
did. 
In Aris, the defendant, a battered woman, appealed a sec-
35. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 195, 197 (West 1988). 
36. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178; CAL. PENAL CODE § 195. 
37. Aria, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79. 
38. See id. at 172. 
39. Perfect self-defense is also referred to as "reasonable" or "complete" 8elf-de-
fense. [d. at 172. 
40. [d. at 172. 
41. [d. at 179. 
42. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 171. 
45. Balash & Kaser-Boyd, supra note 19, at 16. 
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ond degree murder conviction because the trial court excluded 
BWS expert testimony which would have revealed that BWS af-
fected her mental condition at the time of the killing.46 On the 
night of the killing, Brenda Aris' abusive husband beat her and 
threatened that he did not think he would let her live until the 
next morning,''' When her husband fell asleep she went next 
door for some ice fot her injuries.46 She found a gun and took it 
for protection.49 She thought that when she returned home she 
would again be beaten.lio Aris went to the bedroom, sat on the 
bed, and shot her sleeping husband five times in the back. iiI 
In Aris, the court held that expert BWS testimony about a 
defendant's state of mind was not relevant to the objective rea-
sonableness of the defendant's actions in self-defense. iiI The 
court found that the defendant presented no substantial evi-
dence that a reasonable person under the same circumstances 
would have perceived an imminent danger and a need to kill in 
self-defense.1i8 The court believed no reasonable jury could con-
clude that a sleeping victim presents an imminent danger of 
great bodily harm, especially when the defendant left the bed-
room and subsequently returned to shoot the victim.1i4 Neverthe-
less, the court also held that it was error not to permit an expert 
to testify about the defendant's particular experiences as a bat-
tered woman and its effect on her perceptions of danger, its im-
minence, and what actions were necessary to protect herself.1i1i 
The court found that the error was harmless because Aris' own 
testimony showed that there was nothing in the victim's behav-
ior indicating the existence of imminent danger.1i6 
Relying on the expert testimony of Dr. Lenore E. Walker, 
the court stated that a woman who has been battered and then 
threatened with more abuse is more likely to perceive the danger 





51. Aria, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171. 
52. Id. at 180. 
53. Id. at 176. 
54.Id. 
55.Id. 
56. Aria, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 181. 
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involved faster than one who has not been abused.1I7 The court 
found that a battered woman accurately senses when an abusive 
episode is not yet over.1I8 However, the court cautioned that the 
jury may misuse BWS evidence to establish the reasonableness 
requirement for perfect self-defense.1I9 Upon request by the pros-
ecution, the judge should instruct the jury that self-defense tes-
timony is relevant only to prove the honest belief requirement 
for both perfect and imperfect self-defense, not to .prove the rea-
sonableness requirement for perfect self-defense.6o 
Two years after Aris was decided, another court held that 
failure to present evidence of BWS constituted ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.61 In People v. Day, the court reversed a judg-
ment convicting a battered woman of involuntary manslaughter 
and assault with a deadly weapon.62 Valoree Day was living with 
Steve Brown, an abusive partner.6S On the night of the killing 
they argued, he battered her, and she locked herself in the bed-
room.64 Day testified that Brown opened the door and attacked 
her with a knife.611 A struggle ensued and Brown was mortally 
injured; Day fled. 66 Day's appeal was based on ineffective assis-
tance of trial counsel.67 Day's trial counsel admitted that he was 
unaware of the existence of BWS before and during trial and 
never considered investigation, research, or presentation of ex-
pert witness testimony regarding BWS.68 The Day court fol-
lowed the Aris court, holding that expert testimony regarding 
BWS is not relevant to the reasonableness of the accused's ac-
tions in self-defense, but held that BWS evidence was admissi-
ble to rehabilitate the defendant's credibility before the jury.6e 
In presenting its case, the prosecution used many of the stereo-
types and commonly held misconceptions about battered 
57. [d. at 177. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. at 180-81. 
60. [d. at 181. 
61. People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 917 (Ct. App. 1992). 
62. [d. 
63. [d. at 917-18. 
64. [d. at 919. 
65. [d. 
66. See Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 919. 
67. [d. at 916-17. 
68. [d. at 920. 
69. [d. at 922. 
10
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women,70 such as the stereotype and misconception that bat-
tered women can easily leave their batterers.71 The prosecution 
used this basic misconception to challenge the defendant's credi-
bility before the jury by asking the question, "why did she not 
simply leave?"72 In fact, the defense counsel characterized the 
defendant's relationship with her batterer as "mutual combat."7s 
The misconception about battered women is that they all be-
have in the same way and if a w,oman dares to fight back she 
removes herself from the category of women for whom BWS is 
available as a defense.7• 
On appeal, a psychologist and authority on BWS submitted 
an affidavit supporting appellant's motion for a new trial. 711 The 
affidavit dispelled many myths associated with BWS which were 
used by the prosecution to question defendant's credibility dur-
ing the trial,76 The affidavit established that battered women do 
employ active self-defense as a strategy.77 The court held that 
evidence explaining BWS informs the jury that how they think 
the average reasonable person would behave and how the jury 
thinks they personally would behave are not necessarily the 
same way that people who have been battered in fact behave.78 
The court understood that when deciding a case where a bat-
tered woman kills her batterer, the jury will ask "what would I 
do in that situation?" Most people who are unaware of BWS 
would naturally answer this question, "I would just leave." BWS 
testimony helps explain why the battered woman does not leave 
and helps a jury understand the psychological effects battering 
has on a battered woman. BWS theory explains how a battered 
woman can accurately sense that danger still exists and why her 
subjectively honest belief is that she must act to save her life. 
The legislature realized that the general public lacks a thor-
70. ld. at 925. 
71. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 923; See supra text accompanying note 28. 
72. See Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 923. 
73. ld. at 923. 
74. See id. 
75. ld. at 920. 
76. See Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920-21. Myths regarding battered women include: 
battered women are free to leave the relationship at any time; and battered women do 
not defend themselves against their batterers. ld. 
77. ld. at 920. 
78. ld. at 925. 
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ough understanding of the issue of domestic violence and there-
fore BWS expert testimony should play an important role in a 
criminal action where the defendant asserts a plea of self-
defense.79 
C. CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1107 
California Evidence Code Section 1107 was enacted on Jan-
uary 1, 1992.80 Evidence Code Section 1107 permits expert testi-
mony concerning BWS to be admitted in a criminal action.81 In 
pertinent part, Section 1107 states: "In a criminal action, expert 
testimony is admissible by either the prosecution or the defense 
regarding battered women's syndrome, including the physical, 
emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or be-
havior of viCtims of domestic violence. "82 
The purpose of the Bill was to ensure that the courts admit 
BWS evidence in criminal cases.8S Existing law held that BWS 
testimony was relevant to show that the defendant genuinely be-
lieved she was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.84 
Where a defendant's own testimony establishes facts tending to 
show there was nothing in the victim's behavior indicating the 
existence of an imminent danger, BII there is no reasonable 
probability that BWS testimony would convince the jury that 
nevertheless the defendant honestly perceived an imminent 
danger.B8 
The legislature envisioned use of Evidence Code Section 
1107's provisions in the defense of a battered woman who has 
killed or seriously wounded her abuser. In this context, the BWS 
expert testimony would be used to support a claim of self-
79. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993). 
80. See id. 
81. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993). 
82. See id. 
83. Assembly Bill 785, Cal. Leg., 1991-92 Reg. Sess. (proposed Feb. 26, 1991)[herein-
after AB 785). 
84. [d. 
85. As defined by California law, an imminent danger is one that, from appearances, 
must be instantly dealt with. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73. 
86. This is exemplified in the situation where the battered woman kills her batterer 
while he sleeps; e.g., the situation in Aris. See Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176. 
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defense.87 
To date, only one Court of Appeal has published a decision 
which mentions Section 1107. In People v. Romero,88 the court 
interpreted the language of Section 1107 to make expert testi-
mony admissible in any criminal case regardless of the charges 
or defenses.89 However, expert testimony cannot be used to pros-
ecute a batterer for his acts using the BWS evidence to prove 
the occurrence of the acts.90 
In Romero, the defendant had been charged with one count 
of second degree robbery and four counts of attempted rob-
bery.91 She raised the defense of duress, but the jury convicted 
her as charged.92 Her petition for a writ of habeas corpus was 
based on the fact that her trial lawyer failed to present expert 
testimony explaining BWS.9S The court found that the key issue 
in the defenses of duress and self-defense is whether the defend-
ant reasonably and honestly believed 'she was in imminent dan-
ger of great bodily harm or death.94 The court held that the rule 
permitting expert BWS testimony in a self-defense case necessa-
rily permits it in a case where duress is claimed as a defense.911 
BWS evidence was relevant to the woman's credibility and to 
support her testimony that she had a good-faith, objectively rea-
sonable, and honest belief that her act was necessary to prevent 
an imminent threat of greater harm.96 Evidence of BWS ex-
plains a behavior pattern that might otherwise appear unreason-
able to jurors by explaining how a battered woman might think, 
react, or behave, and placing the behavior in an understandable 
light.97 Apparently, the California Supreme Court agrees with 
this holding.98 
87. AB 785, supra note 83. 
88. People v. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332 (Ct. App. 1992), review granted, in part, 
on other grounds, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120 (1993). 
89. [d. at 338 n.9. 
90. [d. 
91. [d. at 333. 
92. [d. 
93. Romero, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333. 
94. [d. at 338. 
95. [d. at 339. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. at 341. 
98. See generally People v. Romero, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120 (Cal. 1993)(granting peti-
tion for review limited to whether a writ of habeas corpus or an order to show cause must 
13
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The legislature enacted Evidence Code Section 1107 realiz-
ing the importance of BWS expert testimony. However, Evi-
dence Code Section 1107 only applies to cases where the defend-
ant's trial occurred after January 1, 1992. An unanswered 
question remains: What is to be done for battered women con-
victed of killing their abusive partners prior to January 1, 1992? 
AB 2295 is not concerned with the importance of BWS expert 
testimony; this is a given in light of Section 1107's enactment. 
Rather, AB 2295 seeks to cure the inequity Section 1107 creates 
by only applying the provisions allowing BWS expert testimony 
from January 1, 1992 forward. 
D. ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 2295 
AB 2295 proposed to give individuals whose convictions be-
came final before January 1, 1992, the date when the legislature 
enacted Evidence Code Section 1107, a chance for review of 
their original trial through a writ of error coram nobis or writ of 
error coram vobis.99 The basis for AB 2295 was to apply justice 
to all people similarly situated in an equal manner. AB 2295 
passed the Senate100 and the Assembly concurred,IOI sending it 
to enrollment102 on September 10, 1993.103 The Governor vetoed 
AB 2295 on October 11, 1993.104 As of the date this article went 
to press, AB 2295 was in the process of being re-introduced in 
the California Assembly. 
1. Modification Of Writs Of Error Coram Nobis And Er-
ror Coram Vobis Under AB 2295 
The distinction between a writ of error coram nobis and a 
writ of error coram vobis is that coram nobis is addressed to the 
court where the petitioner was convicted, and coram vobis is 
issue before a petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted). 
99. AB 2295, supra note 1. 
100. AB 2295 passed the Senate Floor by a vote of 24-5. 
101. The Assembly concurred in the Senate's approval of AB 2295 by a vote of 68-3. 
102. An "enrolled bill" is defined as "The final copy of a bill or joint resolution 
which has passed both houses of a legislature and is ready for signing." BUCK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 276 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983). 
103. Cal. Bill Tracking, AB 2295, Cal. Leg., 1993-94 Reg. Sess. 
104. See Veto, supra note 4. 
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typically directed to an appellate court. 1011 If the judgment was 
affirmed by an appellate court, the writ of error coram nobis 
must be filed in the appellate court which affirmed the judg-
ment.106 A writ of error coram vobis is only an avenue for relief 
if no appeal was taken from the judgment. As the writs of error 
coram nobis and error coram vobis are essentially identical,107 
this article will only discuss the process in terms of a writ or 
error coram nobis. 
A writ of error coram nobis is the equivalent of a motion to 
vacate the judgment.106 In People v. Shipman, the California 
Supreme Court set forth three requirements necessary for the 
granting of a writ of coram nobis: (1) petitioner must show that 
some fact existed which, without any fault or negligence on his 
part, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits, 
and which if presented, would have prevented the rendition of 
the judgment; (2) petitioner must show that the newly discov-
ered evidence does not go to the merits of issues tried; and (3) 
petitioner must show that the facts upon which he relies were 
not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence 
have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier 
than the time of his motion for the writ. 109 
The requirements for the granting of a writ of error coram 
nobis are very strict. no In People v. Esquibel, an order granting 
a petition for writ of error coram nobis was reversed when the 
court found that: (1) the new evidence raised related to the mer-
its of the issues tried, and (2) even if it had been known at the 
time of trial it was not such that it would have resulted in a 
different verdict. 111 
AB 2295 sought to amend the Penal Code requirements for 
105. See generally People v. Esquibel, 118 Cal. Rptr. 748, 750 (Ct. App. 1975)(find-
ing jurisdiction for a writ of error coram nobis to exist in the trial court because the final 
judgment had not been appealed); see Cal. Assembly Committee on Public Safety, Com-
mittee Analysis, May 18, 1993 hearing date. 
106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1265. 
107. See People v. Welch, 394 P.2d 926, 929 (Cal. 1964). 
108. People v. Shipman, 397 P.2d 993, 994 n.2 (Cal. 1965). 
109. See id. at 995. 
110. [d. 
111. See generally Esquibel, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 750 (concerning whether defendant 
intentionally hit officer with his truck, the new evidence was that defendant was looking 
back when the truck struck the officer). 
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a writ of error coram nobis and writ of error coram vobis in cases 
involving BWS. The major change AB 2295 proposed concerning 
writs of error coram nobis was from the standard that petitioner 
must show some fact existed which, without any fault or negli-
gence on his part, was not presented to the court at the trial on 
the merits, and which if presented would have prevented the 
rendition of the judgment.112 The proposed standard under AB 
2295 was a "reasonable probability" that the result would have 
been different had the evidence. of BWS been presented, suffi-
cient to undermine the confidence in the judgment of convic-
tion.113 This only involves evidence that would have been admit-
ted pursuant to Evidence Code Section 1107,114 
The standard of "reasonable probability" comes from 
Strickland v. Washington,llG a case involving a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. The Strickland Court stated that a 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.118 A reasonable probability is a probability suffi-
cient to undermine confidence in the outcome.l1'7 The Strickland 
court stated that a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is an at-
tack on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result 
is challenged. 118 
The reasonable probability standard was chosen for use in 
AB 2295 because the basis of a petition for a writ under AB 2295 
was that BWS testimony was not admitted at trial. This stan-
dard admits that the reason the evidence was not admitted or 
offered during the trial was because the attorney or judge did 
not understand the critical importance of BWS testimony to the 
case. The claim is most certainly an attack on the fundamental 
fairness of the proceeding whose result is challenged. In most 
cases, it is reasonably probable that had BWS testimony been 
admitted it would have affected the outcome of the case.l18 Ad-
112. Shipman, 397 P.2d at 995 (emphasis added). 
113. AB 2295. supra note 1. 
114. Id. 
115. See generally Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984)(defining the stan-
dard of review in an appeal involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
116. Id. at 694. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 697. 
119. See Balash & Kaser-Boyd. supra note 19. at 16-18. 
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mission of BWS testimony would not necessarily result in an ac-
quittal, but possibly a reduced sentence, and perhaps most im-
portantly, the battered women presently incarcerated would be 
judged under the same law as women who had the opportunity 
to use Evidence Code Section 1107. 
2. Requirements For The Petition For Writ Of Error 
Coram Nobis Or Writ Of Error Coram Vobis Under AB 
2295 
AB 2295 would have required a court to grant a verified pe-
tition for a writ of error coram nobis or writ of error coram vobis 
if: (1) the petitioner's judgment of conviction for killing her 
abuser resulted from a plea or trial that commenced before Jan-
uary 1, 1992, and petitioner is imprisoned at the time of filing 
the verified petition; (2) the foundational requirements of Evi-
dence Code Section 1107 are met,120 based on facts set forth in 
the verified petition; (3) any material evidence that would have 
been admissible pursuant to Evidence Code Section 1107 was 
not admitted, and the facts established on a hearing of the writ 
show that had the evidence of BWS been presented, there was a 
reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would 
have been different, sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
judgment of conviction; and (4) the BWS evidence related to the 
battering of the petitioner by the victim of the homicide. 1111 
AB 2295 would have required that the court consider 
whether any evidence of abuse existed in the record, or whether 
the underlying facts of abuse alleged by the petitioner were as-
serted by the petitioner prior to conviction or were corroborated 
by other evidence. laB Corroborating evidence includes, but is not 
limited to, medical records, verified witness statements, and 
court records from any other proceeding.11l8 This language was 
added to assuage the concerns that AB 2295 would create a flood 
of petitions for writs of error coram nobis or coram vobis, 
wherein some petitioners would fabricate claims that they were 
120. The proponent of the evidence establishes its relevancy and the proper qualifi-
cations of the expert witness. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993). 
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sufferers of BWS in order to seek reduced sentences or release 
from prison. 124 
3. Procedural Options Available To Court Reviewing Peti-
tions Under AB 2295 
AB 2295(d) would have provided the court with the options 
found in Penal Code Sections 1260, 1261, and 1262 in handling 
petitions for writs of error coram nobis or coram vobis under AB 
2295.1lI1i 
Penal Code Section 1260 provides: 
The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a 
judgment or order appealed from, or reduce 
the degree of the offense or attempted of-
fense or the punishment imposed, and may 
set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the 
proceedings subsequent to, or dependent 
upon, such judgment or order, and may, if 
proper, order a new trial and may, if proper, 
remand the cause to the trial court for such 
further proceedings as may be just under the 
circumstances.1II8 
Section 1261 requires a new trial, if ordered, to be had in 
the court of the county from which the appeal was taken.187 Sec-
tion 1262 directs that if a judgment is reversed, it will be 
deemed an order for a new trial, unless the appellate court di-
rects otherwise.128 Should the appellate court direct a final dis-
position in defendant's favor, it must direct defendant to be dis-
charged from custody, if defendant is in custody.129 These 
options grant the court wide discretion in dealing with petitions 
under AB 2295, and should provide sufficient safeguards against 
abuse by fraudulent petitions. 
124. Notes from Assemblywoman Barbara Friedman concerning AB 2295 as 
amended Sept. 8, 1993. 
125. AB 2295, supra note 1. 
126. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1260 (West 1982). 
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1261 (West 1982). 
128. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1262 (West 1982). Section 1262 also deals with issues such 
as return of bail posted, and fines paid. [d. 
129. 1d. . 
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III. SHORTCOMINGS OF EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 
1107 
A. EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1107 ONLY ApPLIES PROSPECTIVELY 
Evidence Code Section 1107 only applies to battered women 
whose trials occurred after January 1, 1992.180 Battered women 
convicted prior to this date were convicted without the opportu-
nity to admit BWS expert testimony provided for by Evidence 
Code Section 1107. These women are unjustly imprisoned be-
cause they have been denied this critical opportunity. AB 2295 
sought to provide a remedy to this injustice. 
B. CLEMENCY Is NOT A REALISTIC AVENUE FOR RELIEF 
Presently, the only avenue of relief open to battered women 
convicted of killing their abusers prior to January 1, 1992 is to 
petition the Governor of California for clemency. Clemency is 
defined as "{kJindness, mercy, leniency . .. [and] describers an] 
act of [a] governor of [a] state when he commutes [a] death sen-
tence to life imprisonment, or grants a pardon."13I The Governor 
may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation after sentence, 
except in cases of impeachment.132 In considering clemency re-
quests, the Governor consults with the Board of Prison Termsl33 
and the judge of the court of conviction or the district attorney 
regarding the facts of the case and recommendations as to the 
propriety of clemency.I34 
Regrettably, Governor Wilson has been slow to take action 
on the clemency petitions filed by battered women serving state 
prison sentences for killing their abusive partners,13& and when 
130. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993). 
131. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 131 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983)(emphasis added). 
132. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8. 
133. The Board of Prison Terms periodically recommends a pardon or commutation 
on the basis of good conduct, disproportionate sentencing, or other good cause. CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 4801 (West 1982); Cal. Committee Analysis regarding AB 2373 for the 
Senate Committee on Judiciary, June 16, 1992 hearing date. 
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4803 (West 1982). 
135. See Minouche Kandel, Wilson Doesn't Get It - Governor Misses the Point 
About Battered Women, DAILY J., June 17, 1993, at 4. Governor Wilson has taken two 
years to review the petitions of 33 women who filed for clemency. In the two cases in 
which he granted clemency Wilson expressly stated that he was basing his decision on 
factors other than that the women were justified in defending themselves against their 
abusive partners. Id. 
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he has taken action it has not been encouraging.138 In fact, under 
Governor Wilson clemency does not appear to be a viable ave-
nue of relief for battered women convicted prior to the enact-
ment of Evidence Code Section 1107. 
C. GENEVA LOVE'S CASE AS EXAMPLE OF GOVERNOR WILSON'S 
"UNDERSTANDING" OF THE ISSUES CONCERNING BWS 
One case in particular provides both an example of Gover-
nor Wilson's approach to clemency and the basis for a compel-
ling argument in support of the necessity of AB 2295. Geneva 
Love is a battered woman who is serving a sentence of 17 years 
to life for killing her abusive husband, Azell, during an acute 
battering incident set off by her attempt to leave the relation-
ship.137 The jury convicted her of second degree murder.13S At 
the time of the killing, in 1988, Geneva Love was the mother of a 
2 Y2 year old son, and was pregnant with her second child. iSS 
She had been repeatedly battered and emotionally abused by 
her husband for years.l•O She endured this violence and abuse 
because she loved her husband and, like most battered women, 
believed him when he would apologize and promise that he 
would never hurt her again.w Azell Love was in the military, 
stationed at Fort Ord.H2 He was a heavy drinker and a physi-
cally powerful man. 143 
Two days before the killing, the Loves began arguing about 
whether their young son should sleep with them.H • Mr. Love 
shoved Geneva Love to the floor.lu As she rose, he came at her, 
pushing her in the chest with his forearm; again she fell to the 
136. See generally Hallye Jordan, Killers Could Seek Retrial for Syndrome, DAILY 
J., August 17, 1993 at 1, 7. To date, Wilson has granted two petitions and rejected 14 
others out of 33 filed. 
137. Letter from Christina G. Cordoza, Esq., to The Honorable Barbara Friedman 1 
(June 15, 1993)[hereinafter Cordoza](on file with author). Cordoza is Geneva Love's 
post-conviction counsel. 
138. See supra note 135. 





144. Reporter's Transcript at 428-29, People v. Geneva Love (No. MCR6991)(1989). 
145. [d. 
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floor.14e Geneva Love grabbed a slat from the bed frame in order 
to protect herself. l47 Mr. Love grabbed the board and again 
knocked Geneva Love to the ground. l48 For the next half hour, 
Mr. Love repeatedly punched Geneva Love in the face and the 
rest of her body, and threw her across the room, knowing she 
was pregnant.149 Mr. Love threw Geneva Love against a piece of 
furniture; the corner hit her in the rib cage. lllO Mr. Love threw 
her against the closet with such force that the door split in 
half.lIIl Each time Geneva Love fell to the floor, Mr. Love con-
tinued to deliver blows to her face and body with his fists.lIIll 
Finally, Mr. Love rammed Geneva against the bedroom door, 
smashing her head against the metal hinges.11l3 
When Geneva Love did not get up, Mr. Love threatened to 
hurt their young son.11l4 Geneva Love did not believe Mr. Love 
would hurt his own son.lllll Mr. Love picked up their son by the 
collar, causing his head to fling backward unsupported. IllS Ge-
neva Love then heard the sound of Mr. Love hitting their son.11l7 
Geneva Love immediately went to get her son.11l8 
After this beating, Geneva Love began packing, determined 
to leave the relationship.11l9 She begged her husband to buy her 
and their son bus tickets so they could leave, and he agreed. ISO 
Mr. Love left the house, purportedly to purchase the tickets, but 
did not return until the next morning. lei When he did return, he 
threw the ticket at Geneva Love and told her the bus left in 
thirty minutes. lell When Geneva Love questioned him about the 
146. [d. at 429-30. 
147. [d. at 430. 
148. [d. at 431-32. 
149. Reporter's Transcript at 432, People v. Geneva Love (No. MCR6991)(1989). 








158. [d. at 434. 
159. Cordoza at 1. 
160. [d. 
161. [d. 
162. See Cordoza at 1-2. 
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delay Mr. Love became angry and violent. ISS Fearing that the 
inevitable beating she would receive would be worse than the 
prior day's, she called the military police for help. IS. The officer 
who answered decided her call was not one of "distress" and told 
her to call the city police because she was out of his jurisdic-
tion. ls5 As she tried to call the city police, Mr. Love charged at 
her, twisting his arm around her neck while he disabled the 
phone. ISS He told her she could not leave and that he would kill 
her before she jeopardized his job.ls7 Geneva Love believed his 
threat; terrified and fearing for the safety of her young son and 
herself, she ran to the bedroom to get her husband's gun.IS8 Ge-
neva Love pointed the gun at her husband and begged him to 
leave. ls9 Rather than leave, Mr. Love turned on his wife in a 
manner that made her believe he was going to immediately 
lunge at her.l7° Geneva Love was forced to fire the gun, the bul-
let striking her husband in the neck. l7l Geneva Love's actions 
were not designed to kill her husband. This is evidenced by the 
fact that she tried to stop the bleeding and to obtain emergency 
help.172 Nevertheless, Mr. Love later died. 17S 
Geneva Love, an African-American, was tried by an all-
white jury.174 Seven of the jurors had family in the military; the 
judge was himself a retired military man, and Geneva Love's 
husband was a soldier with a good record.m Monterey County, 
the trial venue, is a "military town,"17S home to Fort Ord, Fort 
Hunter-Liggett, the Presidio of Monterey, the Defense Language 
Institute, and the Naval Postgraduate School.177 These factors 
alone are demonstrative of the hostile and insensitive climate 
163. [d. at 2. 
164. [d. 
165. [d. 
166. See id. 
167. Cordoza at 2. 
168. [d. 
169. [d. 
170. See id. 
171. [d. 
172. Cordoza at 2. 
173. [d. 
174. [d. 
175. [d.; Letter from Richard Rosen, Esq., to The Honorable Pete Wilson, Governor 
of California 2 (Aug. 31, 1992)[hereinafter Rosenj(on file with author). Rosen was Ge-
neva Love's trial counsel. 
176. Rosen at 2. 
177. [d. 
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Geneva Love must have faced during her trial.178 However, most 
important, Geneva Love's trial counsel did not explore the facts 
regarding BWS with Geneva Love and decided not to introduce 
expert testimony regarding BWS.179 Instead, her attorney de-
cided to rely on what he deemed an extremely strong case of 
self-defense.18o 
In a letter supporting Geneva Love's petition for clemency, 
her trial attorney stated that he feared that BWS evidence 
would confuse the issues or might not be accepted by the jury or 
the judge.181 In hindsight, her trial attorney now believes he 
should have introduced BWS evidence in Geneva Love's case. In 
He believes that BWS testimony could have rehabilitated Ge-
neva Love's credibility on the witness stand in the eyes of the 
jury.18S BWS testimony would explain to the jury why Geneva 
Love's testimony may have appeared reserved and cold.18• After 
all, BWS expert testimony could explain to a jury that victims of 
battering relationships do not react in the same way that some-
one who has not been battered would react.1811 
After reviewing her Application for Executive Clemency, the 
trial judge wrote a letter supporting the Application.18e The trial 
judge concluded that if evidence of BWS had been presented at 
the trial, "it is very likely that there would have been an acquit-
tal instead of a conviction.m8'1 He believed that justice would be 
served by a grant of Executive Clemency in Geneva Love's 
case.188 
Governor Wilson denied Geneva Love's petition for clem-
ency on May 27, 1993.189 In his decision, he acknowledged his 
178. See id. 
179. [d. 
180. [d. 
181. Rosen at 2. 
182. [d. 
183. See id. 
184. [d. 
185. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925. 
186. Letter from The Honorable Robert M. Hinrichs, Judge of the Superior Court of 
the State of California for the County of Monterey, to The Honorable Pete Wilson, Gov-
ernor of California 1 (Dec. 21, 1992)[hereinafter Hinrichs](on file with author). 
187. [d. (emphasis added). 
188. [d. 
189. Decision, In the Matter of the Clemency Request of Petitioner A, at 4 (May 27, 
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"deep and abiding concern with the tragic problem of domestic 
violence. "leo Wilson claimed that he is now, and always has 
been, committed to the cause of victims of domestic violence. lei 
Wilson pointed out that the clemency process is not a continua-
tion of the judicial process of a criminal defendant.1e2 He argued 
that without the safeguards and sanctions available to the court, 
he is not in a position to retry criminal cases or to speculate as 
to what might have been if different evidence had been before a 
jury.1eS Governor Wilson did not address the trial judge's letter 
supporting Geneva Love's application for clemency. 
Wilson stated that the exercise of his clemency power re-
quires him to balance a concern for objective justice against a 
claim for compassion based on facts which may mitigate the 
penalty for the crime.1e4 Although moved by the personal factors 
of Geneva Love's case, Wilson stated that: 
[T]he test of whether clemency should be consid-
ered in cases where BWS is asserted, either as a 
defense or mitigation, for the petitioner's deliber-
ate taking of the abuser's life must be: Did peti-
tioner have the option to leave the abuser, or was 
the homicide realistically her only chance to es-
cape him, and further serious physical abuse?1911 
It is astonishing that someone who claims to have a "broad 
commitment to the cause of battered women" could formulate a 
test such as Wilson's. He ignores the symptoms and behavior of 
a battered woman. BWS helps explain why battered women do 
not have the same "option to leave the abuser" as someone in a 
non-battering relationship. lee The unpredictable, yet inevitable 
brutality which battered women suffer at the hands of their bat-
terers results in symptoms of "learned helplessness,"le? and an 
inability to leave. 
1993)[hereinafter Denial](on file with author). 
190. [d. at 1. 
191. See id. 
192. [d. at 3. 
193. [d. 
194. Denial, supra note 189. 
195. [d. (emphasis added). 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28; see Balash & Kaser-Boyd, supra 
note 19, at 14, 18; see Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 924. 
197. See AB 2273, supra note 29. 
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The answer to the second part of Wilson's question: "[W]as 
the homicide realistically her only chance to escape him, and 
further serious physical abuse?" is more than likely a yes in 
most battered women's cases. However, "realistically" needs to 
be defined through the eyes of a battered woman. Failure to con-
sider BWS in defining "realistically" will result in the use of 
misconceptions concerning battered women to compare a bat-
tered woman's conduct against the perceptions and experiences 
of someone who has never been abused.1S8 BWS testimony is 
critically important because it educates the jury as to how a bat-
tered person will likely react in a particular situation. 
Not only is Governor Wilson's test for clemency fundamen-
tally flawed in asking if the battered woman could leave, but 
when this test is applied to Geneva Love's case, it is applied in-
correctly. Geneva Love was psychologically incapable of leaving 
her abuser. When she did in fact muster the bravery to attempt 
to leave she was physically confronted by her abusive husband 
and rendered physically incapable of leaving. In Geneva Love's 
case it appears that killing her abusive husband was her only 
chance to escape him and further serious physical harm. She did 
not want to shoot; she was forced to shoot. 
Furthermore, although Governor Wilson argued that he is 
not in a position to retry a criminal case, he nevertheless applies 
the same legal test a trial court would have applied prior to the 
enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107 by ignoring the role 
BWS evidence should play in a review of a petition for clem-
ency. BWS evidence will help explain a particular battered wo-
man's reactions to the situation she was confronted with when 
she killed her abusive spouse. Without weighing the effects of 
BWS, Governor Wilson is unnecessarily restricting his exercise 
of the clemency power.1SS 
One might interpret Governor Wilson's denial of Geneva 
Love's clemency as a message to the Legislature that the remedy 
for women convicted of killing their abusive partners prior to 
the enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107 will not be found 
198. See Balash & Kaser·Boyd, supra note 19, at 16-18; see Dutton, supra note 10, 
at 12. 
199. See Cookie Ridolfi, Esq., Governor Improperly Restricted Use of Pardoning 
Power, ST. B. BULL., July 28, 1993, 1, 3-4. 
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in the Governor's office. In fact, the executive director of the 
California District Attorneys Association/aoo a supporter of Gov-
ernor Wilson's test for clemency, admits that "[j]ustice is only 
served if a woman's assertion of BWS is supported by the facts 
of her case and there is overwhelming evidence that the homi-
cide was the result of the abuse."201 The implied message is that 
a remedy should come from the enactment of a law setting up a 
procedure to give these women an opportunity for a new trial 
based on fairness and justice. 
IV. GOVERNOR WILSON'S REASONS FOR VETO OF AB 
2295 
Governor Wilson's veto of AB 2295 was based essentially on 
three areas of concern. Governor Wilson stated that although 
the Bill "is obviously well intended,"202 he and "[s]everal elected 
District Attorneys in the state"20S believe it is an inappropriate 
solution. 
Governor Wilson's first concern is that he does not believe a 
generally applicable writ process should be modified for particu-
lar types of psychological defenses.204 He is concerned that AB 
2295 could establish a precedent for recognizing and providing 
special requirements for "other novel defenses" which may de-
velop or gain greater acceptability after a defendant's trial is 
over.2011 
Second, Governor Wilson believes that a defendant who be-
lieves an impropriety occurred at trial has other legal alterna-
tives available.206 
Finally, Governor Wilson believes that the presumption 
favoring the finality of convictions and judgments is so strong in 
200. Michael W. Sweet is the executive director of the California District Attorneys 
Association. 
201. See Michael W. Sweet, Esq., Legal Test Prevents License to Kill by Battered 
Women, ST. B. BULL., July 28, 1993, 1, 3. 
202. Veto Message regarding AB 2295 from the Honorable Pete Wilson, Governor of 
California, to the Members of the California Assembly, dated October 11, 1993. 
203. [d. 
204. [d. at 1-2. 
205. [d. at 2. 
206. [d. 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss1/4
1994] BATTERED WOMEN UNJUSTLY IMPRISONED 125 
cases where a defendant openly admits his or her own culpabil-
ity that no collateral challenge should be allowed.207 He is con-
cerned that AB 2295 would allow the re-litigation of guilty pleas 
which would be extremely difficult for a reviewing court to 
handle.208 
V. RESPONSE TO GOVERNOR WILSON'S VETO 
MESSAGE 
The concerns Governor Wilson expressed in his veto mes-
sage of AB 2295 appear assuagable. Many District Attorneys did 
oppose AB 2295 when it was first introduced on March 5, 
1993.209 However, when AB 2295 was sent to the Governor, the 
California District Attorneys Association (hereinafter CDAA) 
wrote Governor Wilson's office that it would no longer oppose 
the Bill.210 The CDAA letter stated that AB 2295 had been nar-
rowed considerably to prevent abuse and therefore provided suf-
ficient safeguards.211 
First, Governor Wilson's concern with modifying the error 
coram nobis and error coram vobis writ process for BWS is un-
founded for two reasons. One, the importance of BWS testimony 
has already been recognized by the Legislature, and therefore 
Governor Wilson's description of BWS as a "novel defense" is 
incorrect. The Legislature's purpose in enacting Evidence Code 
Section 1107 was to ensure that the courts would admit BWS 
evidence in criminal cases.212 Governor Wilson must have under-
stood the significance of BWS expert testimony; he did sign Sec-
tion 1107 into law. Two, the law must change to accommodate 
scientific and social progress or people will lose confidence in the 
law. The law is not a stagnant body of rules. Our system of gov-
ernment is built on the idea that if change need occur, the legis-
lature as the representative of the people shall enact new laws. 
This very process was exemplified in the enactment of Evidence 
207. See id. at 2. 
208. See id. 
209. See AB 2295, supra note 1. 
210. See letter from Michael W. Sweet, California District Attorneys Association, 
Legislative Advocate, to the Honorable Pete Wilson, Governor of California 1·2 (Sept. 
27, 1993)[hereinafter Sweetj(on file with the author). 
211. See id. 
212. See AB 785, supra note 83. 
27
Baker: Battered Women Unjustly Imprisoned
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
126 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:99 
Code Section 1107. The problems of domestic violence and its 
widespread effect on society are only recently being addressed. illS 
The importance of BWS, a defense which had gained acceptabil-
ity, was recognized and codified by the legislative and executive 
branches of California state government.214 
Second, Governor Wilson's claim that a defendant has other 
available legal alternatives wholly misses the point of AB 2295's 
purpose, namely to remedy the injustice of permitting battered 
women tried after January 1, 1992 to use BWS expert testimony 
while prohibiting those convicted prior to this date from benefit-
ting by the provisions of Evidence Code Section 1107. AB 2295 
was legislation designed specifically to correct this inequity. 
Other legal aiternativesllili are not the issue here since AB 2295 
sought to provide a special avenue applicable to only a limited 
section of the prisoner population because the Legislature real-
ized that other remedies were insufficient.1l16 
Third, Governor Wilson's concern regarding the application 
of AB 2295 to cases involving guilty pleas is baseless for two rea-
sons. One, Governor Wilson based his denial of Geneva Love's 
petition for clemency, in part, on the fact that applications for 
clemency are not processed with the safeguards and sanctions 
available in the courts.217 Governor Wilson obviously recognizes 
that the complicated legal implications surrounding BWS are 
best handled by the courts. AB 2295 provided safeguards for a 
judge's review of petitions. If the requirements for the petition 
were not satisfied; e.g., if the necessary corroborating evidence 
was not shown, the judge would not grant a new trial. The 
CDAA letter withdrawing opposition to AB 2295 conceded that 
it contained sufficient safeguards.218 This provides strong sup-
port in favor of giving deference to the courts to exercise their 
discretion in reviewing petitions under AB 2295. Two, a plea of 
guilty does not necessarily mean the defendant is factually 
guilty. The decision to plea may have resulted from weighing the 
213. See Balash & Kaser-Boyd, supra note 19, at 6-7; Assembly Concurrent Resolu-
tion 10, Cal. Senate, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. 
214. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993). 
215. Such as petitions for writs of habeas corpus. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1473 et 
seq. 
216. See AB 2295, supra note 1. 
217. See Denial, supra note 189, at 3. 
218. Sweet at 1. 
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evidence at the time of trial against any defenses available. Of 
critical importance in this decision-making process is the de-
fendant and her attorney's belief concerning whether or not 
BWS testimony would provide a defense. If BWS testimony was 
not likely to be admitted or was not admitted, a plea of guilty 
based on a plea bargain may have been the least severe option 
available. Also, although trial testimony will likely be absent in 
cases involving guilty pleas, evidence should exist in the district 
attorney's file. This generally includes police reports, witness 
statements, and other relevant evidence.219 Furthermore, the is-
sue should not be decided based on the difficulties and costs in-
volved in administering a remedy such as AB 2295 when a per-
son's freedom and liberty are at stake. 
It would appear that even Governor Wilson, at some level, 
recognizes the importance of BWS expert testimony. After all, 
he personally signed Section 1107 into law. Nevertheless, the 
question as to what will be done for battered women convicted 
prior to the enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107 remains. 
The scrutiny that a bill undergoes while making its way 
through the legislative process is sufficient to assure that any 
precedent established by passing are-introduced AB 2295, for 
recognizing and providing special standards for particular types 
of psychological defenses, will be carefully examined.220 The 
Governor may always exercise the veto power when legislation is 
deemed inappropriate. The Legislature could then act to address 
the Governor's concerns in the next session. This process will 
guarantee that as new defenses are recognized, the legislative 
and executive branches will be able to weigh the appropriateness 
of recognition and codification. 
The following modifications are suggested to address the 
concerns Governor Wilson enumerated in his veto message. Spe-
cifically, language should be added to AB 2295 which provides 
that: (1) BWS is not a "novel defense," and (2) "other legal al-
ternatives" available to battered women convicted prior to the 
219. See Barbara Marmor, When Domestic Violence Supports a Defense to Homi-
cide, CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION PROSECUTOR'S NOTEBOOK, Volume XI 
at 9, 11. 
220. At the time this article went to press, AB 2295 was in the process of being re-
introduced in the California Assembly. 
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enactment of Evidence Code Section 1107 are not sufficient to 
remedy the inequity discussed in this article. Also, language set-
ting forth the judge's discretion and important role in safeguard-
ing against fraudulent or inadequate petitions should be added. 
This would address Governor Wilson's concern regarding the 
treatment of guilty pleas. By far the most important reason for 
re-introducing AB 2295 with language addressing Governor Wil-
son's concerns is to provide the battered individuals convicted of 
killing their abusive partners prior to the enactment of Evidence 
Code Section 1107 the same opportunities to offer BWS evi-
dence as those whose trials came after January 1, 1992. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
AB 2295 was designed to provide a fair and even application 
of the law to those individuals affected by the issue of BWS. 
Battered women charged with criminal activity after January 1, 
1992 are permitted to present BWS expert testimony at their 
trial pursuant to Evidence Code Section 1107. Battered women 
convicted prior to this date remain unjustly imprisoned with 
seemingly no viable avenue of relief. AB 2295 was developed to 
provide a remedy to these individuals. 
AB 2295 was based on the belief that justice should be ap-
plied equally. AB 2295 contained the necessary safeguards to 
guarantee that the modified writ process would not be abused by 
fraudulent claims. 
The issue regarding AB 2295 is not one of administrative 
difficulties, costs, or economy; it is a question of what is fair and 
just. The battered women convicted prior to January 1, 1992 and 
unjustly imprisoned in California's penal system have been de-
nied a fair trial because they lacked the opportunity to present 
all relevant evidence. These women should not be subject to the 
further deprivation of their rights and liberty simply because the 
present Governor appears to have: (1) closed clemency as an av-
enue of relief while implying that the issue is one for the courts 
to address, and (2) vetoed the legislature's only response to solv-
ing the inequity presented by Evidence Code Section 1107. 
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APPENDIX A 
AB 2295 would add and repeal Chapter 5 (commencing with 
Section 1266) of Title 9 of Part 2 of, the Penal Code, as follows: 
CHAPTER 5. WRIT OF ERROR REGARDING 
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
1266. (a) The Legislature hereby finds and de-
. clares that a unique circumstance exists today 
that necessitates remedial legislation with regard 
to victims of battered woman syndrome. In this 
regard, a small number of individuals are cur-
rently serving terms of imprisonment substan-
tially longer than would persons charged today of 
identical offenses. These individuals, victims of 
domestic violence, were convicted of killing their 
abusers prior to the courts appreciating the rele-
vance of battered woman syndrome expert testi-
mony to issues of self-defense or heat of passion. 
Battered woman syndrome expert testimony is 
critical to understanding a battered person's ac-
tions and beliefs which may appear unreasonable 
to the average person. A remedy to this circum-
stance should be provided in the courts where 
procedural safeguards and sanctions are available. 
It is therefore the intent of the Legislature in 
enacting this section to extend a writ of error 
coram nobis or writ of error coram vobis to those 
individuals convicted before January 1, 1992, who 
would have benefited by the admission of bat-
tered woman syndrome evidence pursuant to Sec-
tion 1107 of the Evidence Code. It shall not be a 
basis for denial of the writ if issues relevant to 
self-defense, sudden quarrel, or heat of passion 
were introduced at time of trial. This section is 
not intended to change the elements of any crime. 
It is only intended to make changes with respect 
to the writ of error coram nobis with respect to 
evidence as it relates to battered woman 
syndrome. 
(b) If a petition for a writ of error coram nobis or 
writ of error coram vobis is brought to procure a 
vacation of a judgment and the verified petition 
for the writ satisfactorily shows that all of the fol-
lowing conditions are met, the court shall grant 
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the writ of error coram nobis or writ of error 
coram vobis: 
(1) The petitioner's judgment of conviction for a 
violation of Section 187 resulted from a plea or 
trial that commenced before January 1, 1992, the 
date Section 1107 was added to the Evidence 
Code, and the petitioner is imprisoned at the time 
of filing the verified petition. 
(2) The foundational requirements of Section 
1107 of the Evidence Code would be met, based 
on facts set forth in the verified petition. 
(3) Any material evidence that would have been 
admissible pursuant to Section 1107 of the Evi-
dence Code was not admitted; and the facts es-
tablished on a hearing of the writ show that had 
the evidence of battered woman syndrome been 
presented, there is a reasonable probability that 
the result of the proceedings would have been dif-
ferent, sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
judgment of conviction. 
(4) The battered woman syndrome evidence re-
lates to the battering of the petitioner by the vic-
tim of the homicide. 
(c) In determining whether to issue the writ, the 
court shall take both of the following into 
consideration: 
(1) The state of the record and the evidence. 
(2) Whether there is any evidence of abuse in the 
record, or whether the underlying facts of abuse 
alleged by the p.etitioner were asserted by the pe-
titioner prior to conviction or are corroborated by 
other evidence. Corroborating evidence includes, 
but is not limited to, medical records, verified wit-
ness statements, and court records from any other 
proceeding. 
(d) Sections 1260, 1261, and 1262 shall apply to 
the granting of a writ of error coram nobis or writ 
of error coram vobis. 
1267. This chapter shall remain in effect only un-
til January 1, 1998, and as of that date is 
repealed. III 
221. AB 2295. supra note 1. 
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